Games Theory
Índice
1 Introduction
This article intends explain with emacs lisp examples the basis of the game theory.
In the games theory the economical agents has strategies and each agent earns something depending of his own strategy and the strategy of the adversary.
For instance, the game of stone, paper and scissor. There are two players. Paper wins versus stone, scissor versus paper, and stone versus scissor. We can represent this game with the next list.
;; PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 ;; Stone Paper Scissor (setq stonePaperScissor '( ((0 0) (1 -1) (-1 1)) ;; Stone ((-1 1) (0 0) (1 -1)) ;; Paper ((1 -1) (-1 1) (0 0)))) ;; Scissor
We can write a function to know who wins with a specific strategy in any game:
(defun profit (i j player game) (interactive) (elt (elt (elt game i) j) player))
In stone, paper and scissor, if i=0 and j=0 and player=0, we want know how many earns the player 1 if both players chose stone. So, we have coded stone=0, paper=1 and scissor=2 in our game. We can execute it:
(profit 0 0 0 stonePaperScissor)
2 Equilibrium Concept
Players with strategies, such as no player has incentives to change the strategy. In stone, paper and scissor, change the strategy is change from stone to scissor, for instance.
We can represent the calculus if is profitable change of strategy for a player in a specific position with the function equilibrium:
(defun equilibrium (i j player game) (interactive) ;; corners in the matrix (cond ((and (= i 0) (= j 0)) (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= i (- (length game) 1)) (= j 0)) (and (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= i 0) (= j (- (length game) 1))) (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= i (- (length game) 1)) (= j (- (length game) 1))) (and (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ;; awns ((and (= i 0) (> j 0) (not (= j (- (length game) 1)))) ;; left (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= i (- (length game) 1)) (> j 0) (not (= j (- (length game) 1)))) ;; right (and (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= j 0) (> i 0) (not (= i (- (length game) 1)))) ;; down (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ((and (= j (- (length (elt game 0)) 1)) (> i 0) (not (= i (- (length game) 1)))) ;; up (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) ;; rest ((and (> j 0) (> i 0) (not (= i (- (length game) 1))) (not (= j (- (length game) 1)))) ;; left (and (>= 0 (- (profit (+ i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit (- i 1) j player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (+ j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))) (>= 0 (- (profit i (- j 1) player game) (profit i j player game))))) )) ;; (equilibrium 0 1 0 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio ;; (equilibrium 0 2 1 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio ;; (equilibrium 1 0 1 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio ;; (equilibrium 1 2 0 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio ;; (equilibrium 2 0 0 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio ;; (equilibrium 2 1 1 stonePaperScissor) OK Equilibrio
In (0, 1), the player J1 has not incentive to change if the oponent maintains the strategy (he earns 0 with (0, 0) or (1, 0) and -1 with (2, 0). In this situation, we say there are an equilibrium in (0, 1) for the player 1.
3 Not Cooperative Games
A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance, the legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. In not cooperative games, this is not possible.
To understand the equilibrium concept and some application of the games theory, we can expose some classical not cooperative games
In this games, we can ponderate some preferences to change the scenario:
R = Reward T = Temptation P = Penalization S = Sucker
If both player are cooperating, both obtain a reward. If one player decides traitionate to the another one, he has a temptation if wins, and a penalization if he fails. A player sucker is a player who has been traitionated.
| Order of preferences | Game |
| T > R > P > S | Prisoner's Dilemma |
| R > T > P > S | Security |
| T > R > S > P | Chiken |
| R > T > S > P | Privileged |
3.1 Priviliged Game
This game is the best game to the cooperation between the examples. Take a look to the table:
| C | D | |
| C | (3, 3) | (1, 2) |
| D | (2, 1) | (0, 0) |
If both are cooperating the earning is strong, who wins defraudin is not winning too much, and if both defrauds the punishing is strong.
(setq priviliged '( ;; Cooperate Defraud ((3 3) (1 2)) ;; Cooperation ((2 1) (0 0)) ;; Defraud )) ;; (elt (first (first priviliged)) 0) ;; (equilibrium 0 0 0 priviliged) OK Equilibrium ;; (equilibrium 0 0 1 priviliged) OK Equilibrium
The equilibrium is in (C, C).
3.2 Prisioner's Dilemma
This game is the opposite, where the cooperation is the worst strategy.
| C | D | |
| C | (2, 2) | (0, 3) |
| D | (3, 0) | (1, 1) |
Really, if both defrauds both is earning a little bit, the worst punishing is when one player wants cooperate and the another one wants to defraud.
(setq prisioner '( ;; Cooperate Defraud ((2 2) (0 3)) ;; Cooperation ((3 0) (1 1)) ;; Defraud )) ;; (equilibrium 1 0 0 prisioner) OK Equilibrium ;; (equilibrium 0 1 1 prisioner) OK Equilibrium
The equilibrium is in (C, C).
3.3 Security Game
In this game the best strategy is the imitation, if the opponent is cooperative, you can cooperate, and if the opponent is a fraud, you must be a fraud.
| C | D | |
| C | (3, 3) | (0, 2) |
| D | (2, 0) | (1, 1) |
(setq security '( ;; Cooperate Defraud ((3 3) (0 2)) ;; Cooperation ((2 0) (1 1)) ;; Defraud )) ;; (equilibrium 0 0 0 security) OK Equilibrium ;; (equilibrium 0 0 1 security) OK Equilibrium
The equilibrium is in (C, C) for both players.
3.4 Chicken Game
In this game is a good strategy cooperate, but the best option is to be a fraud if the another player is a cooperative player.
| C | D | |
| C | (2, 2) | (1, 3) |
| D | (3, 1) | (0, 0) |
(setq chicken '( ;; Cooperate Defraud ((2 2) (1 3)) ;; Cooperation ((3 1) (0 0)) ;; Defraud )) ;; (equilibrium 0 1 1 chicken) OK Equilibrium ;; (equilibrium 1 0 0 chicken) OK Equilibrium
The equilibrium is in (C, D) for player 2 and (D, C) for player 1.
4 Bibliography
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2009). "Teoría de Juegos" Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
5 License
This document is under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
